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1 Introduction
lt has been more than a year since the currency
crisis broke out in Thailand and spread to other
Southeast Asian countries and Korea. Although the
crisis is far from over, its severity has generated an
enormous and growing volume of literature on the
causes and effects of the East Asian turmoil. Most
of the recent studies seek to unearth the domestic
and external factors that led to the collapse of the
foreign exchange and domestic financial markets
and plunged East Asian economies into deep reces-
sion. Not surprisingly, these studies are divided on
the question of whether the crisis was attributable
to an unsustainable deterioration in underlying
fundamentals or to intrinsic instability in interna-
tional lending, which tends to provoke financial
panic where short-term creditors withdraw their
loans en masse from solvent borrowers without
warning.
Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b) suggest that
neither the changes in international factors nor
domestic developments, including political
changes, could justify the deep crisis that is still
raging in East Asia; they cite instead creditor panic
as the major cause of the crisis. Many others dis-
agree with this diagnosis and point to growing
weaknesses in financial systems and governance
and poor economic policies in the region, although
they too would concede that the financial markets
overreacted and that asset prices fell further than
warranted by the initial deterioration.' Although
the controversy is essentially an empirical issue,
empirical studies have been unable to resolve it,
largely because of the lack of data and difficulty in
modelling the crisis.
A casual observation of the movements in
exchange rates and other asset prices throughout
the region since July 1997 shows that the Thai cri-
sis has spilled over into other countries in the
region. The spillover also raises the issue of
Statistical and empirical evidence referred to in this
article is given in detail in the above mentioned
conference paper on which this article is based,
presented at the East Asia Crisis Workshop, 13-14 July,
1980, and which is referred to as Park and Song (1998).
See, for instance, Krugman (1998a, 1998b),
Dornbusch (1998), and Corsetti et al. (1998). This is
also the official view of the IMF on the Asian crisis; see
Fischer (1998).
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whether the Thai crisis caused market participants
to panic and withdraw their investments and lend-
ing from neighbouring countries, irrespective of the
strength of their fundamentals. According to
Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b), many interna-
tional lenders may have regarded the region as basi-
cally a single entity and therefore expected other
countries in the region to experience, soon, similar
difficulties to Thailand's. In other words, the conta-
gion has been driven by the irrational behaviour of
international lenders, as was the case when the Thai
crisis broke out.
Corsetti et al. (1998), on the other hand, argue that
the contagion was rational and that real shocks may
have been propagated through trade spillovers and
competitive devaluations, common domestic and
external shocks, and financial investment and trade
links between the countries. From our perspective,
the contagion process is important in that it could
shed some light on whether the financial crisis was
caused by financial panic or deterioration in
economic fundamentals.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the causes
and consequences of the East Asian financial crisis
with the view to discovering whether intrinsic insta-
bilities in the international capital markets helped
set it in motion and also whether they deepened the
crisis, particularly in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Korea. Section 2 analyses some of the causes
and consequences of the crisis in these countries.
This will be followed in section 3 by an examination
of the spillover effects of the Thai crisis on other
countries. An empirical analysis of the various
causes of contagion is in section 4, and concluding
remarks are in the final section.
2 Causes and Consequences of
the Crisis
2.1 Causes
Radelet and Sachs (1998b) suggest three broad cat-
egories of explanations for the East Asian crisis: (j)
a shift in international market conditions; (ii) grow-
ing weaknesses and mismanagement in the East
Asian economies; and (iii) instability intrinsic to the
international capital markets. According to Fischer
2 See also Stiglitz (1998a) on this point.
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(1998), the East Asian difficulties are primarily the
result of inadequate financial sector supervision and
poor assessment and management of financial risks.
Combined with these risks, relatively fixed
exchange rates led banks and corporations to bor-
row large amounts of international capital, much of
it short-term, denominated in foreign currency, and
unhedged. The crisis was further exacerbated by
governance issues such as lack of transparency in
the accounting system and unreliability of financial
and economic data.
In opposition to this view, Radelet and Sachs
(1998a) argue that while the first two conditions
certainly played a role, the structural deficiencies of
the international capital market were primarily
responsible for the depth, severity, extent, and
simultaneity of the crisis in the region. Thailand
was suffering an illiquidity, not as insolvency prob-
lem, because it had the capacity to service its for-
eign debts in the long term, but was unable to
borrow fresh funds to remain current on its debt
servicing obligations in the short run. The creditors
panicked, and their abrupt refusal to roll over short-
term foreign loans provoked the crisis in Thailand
and its spread to the other East Asian countries.
Although it is too early to determine the relative
significance of the two contrasting views, a closer
examination of the series of events that led to the
currency crisis in East Asia and the available evi-
dence leave little doubt that the massive capital
inflows to the region during the early 1990s played
a great part in bringing on the East Asian crisis.
Financial institutions and private corporations in
Thailand and other crisis-stricken countries in East
Asia were at fault in overborrowing excessively from
international capital markets and in financing poor-
quality investments. At the same time, however,
international lenders must also bear the blame for
the East Asian crisis, because it was they who were
willing to lend so much money to banks and cor-
porations in East Asia without due diligence and
careful risk analyses.2
According to the IMF, the East Asian developing
countries experienced a net inflow of $320 billion
during the period of 1990-95, more than twice
their total inflow during the whole decade of the
1980s.3 Capital inflows into the five Asian countries
discussed here - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand - averaged over 6 per cent
of GDP between 1990 and 1995. The net capital
inflows into Thailand averaged more than 10 per
cent of GDP during the same period and actually
reached 13 per cent in 1995. The bulk of the
inflows were funds borrowed by banks and finan-
cial institutions. In Indonesia, the inflows averaged
a more modest 3.9 per cent of GDP, mostly in the
form of borrowing by the corporate sector. Malaysia
also saw a massive increase in capital inflows, aver-
aging 9.7 per cent of GDP, but these inflows con-
sisted mostly of foreign direct investment (FUI).
Korea had also been a recipient of a large capital
inflow, much of which was borrowing by banks and
other financial institutions, although the total
amount relative to GDP was a modest 2.2 per cent.
The capital inflows to each of these countries had
been excessive in that they were much larger than
could have been absorbed in the short-run without
destabilising the foreign exchange and other
domestic financial markets. The capital inflows put
upward pressure on prices of non-tradeables and
built up excess supply of foreign exchange, leading
to a substantial appreciation of the real exchange
rates (REPs).
The massive inflows also fuelled the large increase
in domestic bank lending in the region: much of the
lending was financed by bank borrowing offshore.
The increase in the availability of both domestic and
external financing generated strong stimuli for
domestic investment. Domestic investment surged
in all of the five countries in the 1990s, and in the
case of Thailand and Malaysia, it shot up to over 40
per cent of GDP The investment boom pushed up
the demand for imports and eventually resulted in
a large increase in current account deficits because
the rates of saving in these countries remained rela-
tively stable.
Corsetti et al. (1998) argue that the rise in foreign
indebtedness was to a large extent driven by domes-
tic investment promoted by the East Asian govern-
ments themselves out of their eagerness to sustain
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high rates of growth. However, in our view, the
causality ran in the opposite direction: other than
the capital inflows, there had been no developments
that could have stimulated investment to such a
degree. Empirical evidence comparing the ratios of
the current account to GDP and of net capital
inflows to GDP before and after capital account lib-
eralisation can be shown to be consistent with this
hypothesis (Park and Song 1998). This supports the
argument that with the opening of domestic finan-
cial markets and decontrol of capital account trans-
actions, capital inflows into the East Asian countries
surged and that the increased availability of foreign
capital had made it easier to finance many of the
projects which would not have been undertaken
otherwise. That is, capital inflow was driving
domestic investment, not the other way around.
Although the available evidence is not conclusive, a
substantial proportion of the investment was
directed to projects in the non-tradeable sector, in
particular real estate and property, and to specula-
tive investment in stocks and other financial assets
in some of the East Asian countries. In Thailand, it
is evident that such investment fuelled real asset
speculation and created a bubble in the property
market. However, in other countries, notably Korea,
the bulk of the capital inflow had been used to
finance investment in manufacturing.
During the investment boom period, the incremental
capital output ratios (ICORs) rose in all countries
except the Philippines. The increase, which reflects
a decline in the profitability of investment, may
have been one of the factors which made these
countries more vulnerable to a crisis. However,
Radelet and Sachs (1998a) argue that the decline in
investment quality was not serious enough to pro-
voke a crisis, since other emerging markets with
higher ICORs did not experience a crisis.
Throughout East Asia, export growth began to slow
considerably around 1996 as a number of adverse
developments had cut into the competitiveness of
exporters in the region. As noted earlier, the capital
inflows were exerting appreciatory pressure on the
real exchange rates, and this was further aggravated
by the continuous depreciation of the Japanese yen
East Asian developing countries include Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.
China, Indonesia, Korea, People's Republic of Lao,
against the US dollar, which had begun in August
1995, while the long awaited recovery of the
Japanese economy has yet to occur. To make mat-
ters worse, these countries also suffered a large
deterioration in the terms of trade in the early
1990s. It is not surprising that the combination of
these developments contributed to the decline in
export growth and to a further increase in current
account deficits.
With the slowdown in growth in export earnings
and the associated deceleration in GDP, a growing
number of both large and small firms suffered heavy
losses and were unable to meet their debt obliga-
tions. Many of them eventually went bankrupt.
What in some respects was the critical event leading
to the crisis, however, was the bursting of the bub-
ble in the property market in Thailand in early
1997. The increasing number of business failures
then translated into a large increase in non-per-
forming loans at banks and other financial institu-
tions. The visible deterioration in some of the
macroeconomic fundamentals became a cause of
growing concern among both domestic and foreign
creditors, as the rapid growth supported by foreign
capital began to appear unsustainable as early as in
the second quarter of 1996.
The cost of borrowing offshore started to go up and
foreign creditors became increasingly reluctant to
extend new loans to either banks or private corpo-
rations in the five countries. The availability of credit
at the long end of the international capital markets
began to dry up and, as a result, a growing share of
the current account deficits had to be financed by
short-term foreign-currency borrowing. By the third
quarter of 1997, the short-term liabilities of
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, which were going
to mature before the end of the year, exceeded their
holdings of foreign exchange reserves. While the
growing current account deficits, the increasing
costs of borrowing from the international capital
markets, the losses of reserves, and the burgeoning
short-term foreign liabilities were reaching danger-
ous levels, the policymakers were often inconsistent
in their policy responses. They were also in some
respects misguided, especially in maintaining effec-
tive pegging of their currencies to the US dollar.
What is more, the frequent changes in policy stance,
which were often dictated by political considerations,
greatly undermined the credibility of the governments.
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lt is the bursting of the speculative bubble in the
property markets and the failure of finance compa-
nies which appear to have triggered the crisis in
Thailand. The effects of the Thai crisis were then
transmitted to the neighbouring countries. With a
time lag, both Hong Kong and Taiwan came under
speculative attacks in October 1997, but they were
able to ward them off. Korea was not so lucky A
series of corporate bankruptcies, a rising current-
account deficit, and increasingly serious non-per-
forming loan problems at commercial banks and
merchant banks threw the country into a severe
currency crisis in late November 1997.
Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b) argue that the
changes in international conditions, such as the
depreciation of the Japanese yen and the terms-of-
trade losses, could not explain the sudden eruption
of the currency crises in East Asia. Although the
economic and political changes in the East Asian
economies - in particular the growing weaknesses,
policy mismanagement, and the revelations of the
true severity of the difficulties in the corporate and
banking sectors - obviously played a role, they were
not so serious as to cause such a sudden shift in
market expectations as actually occurred in East
Asia. Radelet and Sachs also provide econometric
evidence supporting their hypothesis.
To what extent were international creditors the
culprits of the East Asian crisis? If they were culprits
at all, how serious was their herd behaviour?
Creditors acting irrationally cannot exert much
effect individually; but collectively, they can pro-
duce sharp, costly, and fundamentally unnecessary
reversals in capital inflows because no one creditor
is willing to make a loan if too many other creditors
do not lend as well (Radelet and Sachs 1998a,
1998b). In our view, international investors cannot
avoid bearing most of the blame for the crisis. They
exacerbated the adjustment costs that caused their
flight in the first place. The consequences of their
panic proved their perception of the economic and
political difficulties in a self-fulfilling way
Even before capital market transactions were dereg-
ulated and ever increasing volumes of foreign capi-
tal began to flow into East Asia, most of these
countries were already growing at higher rates than
any others in the world. In fact, it is this success,
and the potential for future success, that attracted
foreign capital into the region. Not only was there
both rapid growth and domestic stability, but the
rates of return to capital, adjusted for credit and
market risks, were and still are relatively high in
East Asia. In most East Asian countries, the national
budgets are balanced or are generating surpluses.
Since the mid-1980s, all of the countries in the
region have pursued ambitious policies of trade and
financial liberalisation, and they continue to do so
to this day Given these sound economic funda-
mentals and the region's commitment to liberalisa-
don, commercial banks, fund managers, and other
institutional investors saw enormous opportunities
to make money and therefore lent enormous sums
to East Asian borrowers. Many East Asian financial
markets have become emerging markets, where
investors have sought to be the first to move in and
also to be ready to get out first, if need be. To some,
this type of investment and economic expansion
looked like a speculative bubble in the making.4
When foreign investors see an opportunity to earn
handsome returns, they often rush into a local
financial market as a herd. As a result, the volume
of their aggregate lending can be excessive in that it
is greater than what the host country can absorb in
the short run. Many of these foreign investors, espe-
cially small creditors, are likely to be noise traders,
in that they follow closely major international
banks' patterns in their lending, since it would be
too costly for them to collect and analyse economic
and other information on the economies they invest
in and to do due diligence on the local institutions
of those countries.
By the end of June 1997, relatively small Canadian
and European banks had lent to Korea $10,721
million, which was 5.7 per cent of their total inter-
national lending. Within a six-month period, they
curtailed their lending by $2,973 million, thereby
reducing their Korean exposure to 2.7 per cent,
much greater adjustments than those by the major
international banks from the UK, Germany, and
France during the same period. According to esti-
mates of the Institute of International Finance, the
external financing of the five East Asian countries
See Park (1996).
According to Stiglitz (1998b), the misallocation of
investment in the crisis countries is not evidence that
their system is fundamentally flawed and better
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(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand) fell to $15.2 billion in 1997 from almost
$93 billion. A swing of more than $70 billion over
a period of only one year cannot be anything but
the result of a financial panic.
The policy authorities in East Asia should have been
more careful in opening their financial markets and
should have better managed and more efficiently
allocated the inflows of foreign capital. However,
during the early 1990s, these countries were under
heavy external pressure to deregulate and open
their financial systems, although in retrospect it is
clear they were unprepared to do so, given their
lack of experience and expertise in supervising
financial institutions. This external demand was
compounded by the domestic market pressure
stemming from the large interest rate differential
between the home and foreign markets.5
Could they have avoided or minimised the costs of
the crisis if they had been more aggressive in liber-
alising their financial markets? The available evi-
dence would suggest not. After accepting the IMP
programme, Korea, since December 1997, has car-
ried out extensive financial market deregulation
and opening. Although Korea is still in a crisis con-
dition, the financial market opening has so far done
very little in the way of restoring the confidence of
foreign market participants in the Korean economy
It is often argued that had Korea opened the domes-
tic long-term bond market earlier, it would have
been able to rely less on short-term foreign currency
loans and hence minimise the risks of a liquidity
problem. This argument is seriously flawed. Foreign
holders of Korean equities had begun to pull out of
the Korean market in September 1997, even before
Korea's financial situation became precarious,
thereby precipitating the crisis. Foreign investors
holding non-public Korean bonds would have
acted accordingly whenever they became uncertain
and frightened off by the pessimistic prospects of
the Korean economy.6
As noted earlier, there had been no evidence, statis-
tical or otherwise, that East Asian economies
regulation of banks would not have deterred private
corporations and non-banks from borrowing directly on
international capital markets.
See Park (1998).
borrowed heavily to sustain high rates of
investment at home before the onset of the crisis in
the region. Even if the policymakers of these coun-
tries were following such a development strategy,
they would not have been able to borrow as much
as they did unless there were willing lenders. And
our analysis shows that there were plenty of eager
lenders bringing large sums of money into the
region for the purchase of financial as well as real
assets and for lending to financial institutions.
Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and the Philippines were
all extremely averse to the kind of pell-mell finan-
cial market opening often demanded of them. In
the end, they buckled under the pressure, even
though they knew that they were not prepared to
pursue comprehensive opening.
Using a simple probit model, we have empirically
examined whether the onset of the crisis in East
Asia was the result of an unsustainable deterioration
in macroeconomic fundamentals or caused by
financial panic. Our analysis uses a panel data for
the 1995-97 period for eight East Asian countries.
Of the eight economies, Indonesia, Thailand,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea fell into crises,
whereas Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore man-
aged to successfully fend off similar crises. Our pro-
bit model uses four explanatory variables: the
current accountlGDP ratios; growth rate of private
claims; the degree of real exchange rate overvalua-
tion; and the ratio of foreign reserve holdings to
short-term foreign liabilities plus imports. If the cri-
sis is a case of a liquidity problem, foreign reserve
holdings should be significant in our estimation.
Our estimation results show that the current
account deficit, misalignment of the real exchange
rate and the size of the international reserve were
important (Park and Song 1998). Our results are
not able to determine which interpretation - finan-
cial panic or fundamentals - goes further in
explaining the causes of financial crises in East
Asian countries. It appears that both variables
played roles in initiating and deepening the
currency crisis.
2.2 One year after the crisis
One year after the crisis erupted in Thailand and
spread to other countries in the region, East Asia is
littered with idle plants, insolvent financial institu-
tions, loan defaults, and bankrupt businesses, both
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large and small. All of the countries hit by the
currency attack are now in deep recession. Their
GDP growth will collapse in 1998 with no
prospects for early recovery. The total volume of
foreign capital inflows has dwindled to a trickle and
is unlikely to exceed the 1997 level. Similarly the
RERs, which depreciated sharply in 1997, are
unlikely to change significantly for some time to
come. The stock markets in the region remain
depressed and show little sign of recovery
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea are expected to
generate large 'recession surpluses' on their current
accounts, ranging from 2 per cent of GDP in
Indonesia to 8 per cent in Korea in 1998. It was
expected that after the IMF programmes were initi-
ated the patterns of adjustment in these countries
would follow a 'V' shaped recovery but with the
passage of time, it appears that the performances
are more likely to resemble the letter 'L, with long
drawn-out floors. Unlike Mexico in 1994 and 1995,
the East Asian countries are going to suffer a deep,
sharp shock with long-lasting effects. The East
Asian recovery has been further frustrated by the
ongoing crïsis in Japan, which is no longer able to
play the role of locomotive in the region.
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea have been pursuing
IMF rescue and restructuring plans. We have to ask,
is this working? In all three countries, the major
components of the IMF programmes include: (i) a
macroeconomic policy framework based on fiscal
tightening and monetary contraction aimed at sta-
bilising the nominal exchange rate; (ii) financial,
corporate, and labour market restructuring; and
(iii) market deregulation and opening, including in
the financial sector.
The IMF programmes were designed to reestablish
financial market confidence by stabilising the
exchange rate. In this regard, the contractionary
monetary and fiscal policy was necessary and to
some extent successful in calming the foreign
exchange markets in earlier stages of the crises, but
it has also exacted a heavy cost on these countries,
as we shall discuss later in this section. The IMP
places emphasis on structural reforms as a crucial
element of its rescue programmes in restoring
financial market confidence. To signal their deter-
mination, the crisis countries were asked to take
decisive actions by closing or suspending non-
viable financial institutions as well as to follow a
strict timetable of longer-term reforms for the finan-
cial markets, corporate governance, and domestic
market liberalisation and opening.
In earlier stages of the crisis, the IMF programme
for Korea stood out as the most successful of all the
similar programmes applied to countries in East
Asia. A wide range of measures for financial market
opening, suspension of a number of failing mer-
chant banks and, most importantly, the Korean gov-
ernment's commitment to restructuring of financial
institutions saddled with huge burdens of non-per-
forming loans and highly leveraged and poorly
managed large conglomerates, were well received
and widely considered appropriate by foreign finan-
cial-market participants and multilateral institu-
tions alike. This favorable response no doubt
helped Korea to reschedule $24 billion in short-
term foreign liabilities at banks into longer-term
loans in early February 1998.
This rescheduling was followed in April 1998 by
the successful floating of $4 billion in sovereign
bonds. These two events were regarded as the turn-
ing point in Korea's adjustment in the crisis and
signs of a quick recovery with severe but transitory
effects, resembling the pattern of the Mexican
adjustment. However, the Korean economy has
since sunk deeper into recession, and perhaps for
this reason, foreign creditors' confidence has yet to
be restored, as evidenced by Korea's borrowing cost
premium of 500 basis points or more over LIBOR
(London Inter-Bank Offered Rate).
Soon after the restructuring plan was announced in
early 1998 in Korea, reports began to surface that the
levels of non-performing loans and corporate debts
were much higher than expected. The total of non-
performing loans at banks was estimated to be more
than 100 trillion won ($70 billion), much more than
expected, and the volume of corporate debts was
estimated at almost twice the size of Korea's annual
GDP The dismal state of affairs at Korean corpora-
tions and financial institutions naturally raised
uncertainties in the minds of foreign creditors as to
whether Korea would be able to mobilise enough
resources domestically to pay off these debts.
In the meantime, the high nominal interest rate and
credit crunch further deepened the recession. Since
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most Korean firms are highly leveraged, the high
cost of credit increased their debt service burden so
much that an increasing number of both large and
small firms - some of which would be completely
viable under normal circumstances - have been
closing down their operations. The unemployment
rate at the beginning of May 1998 was more than
twice the rate of a year earlier, and the GDP forecast
for 1998 has been revised downward to minus 5
per cent. The current account has been generating a
huge surplus almost entirely because of the collapse
in imports.
Contrary to initial expectations, the real exchange-
rate depreciation and domestic recession have not
improved the prospects for a boom in Korea's
exports, certainly not as much as under different
circumstances. Exporters have been hampered by
the limited availability of suppliers' credits and by
the unwillingness of foreign banks to accept Korean
banks' letters of credit. The limited availability of
import credits has also made it costly for exporters
to import parts, components, and other industrial
materials needed to produce export goods.
What has gone wrong in Korea and the other crisis
countries in East Asia which have been following an
IMF programme? By and large Korea's experience
with restructuring would typify the kinds of
predicaments these countries are faced with,
although they would differ in detail.
Foreign lenders, including major international
banks, have yet to resume new lending. They are
even reluctant to restore trade credit facilities,
largely because they are uncertain about the future
outcomes of the restructuring plans of these coun-
tries. Their position has been that they would not
return to East Asian financial markets unless they
are convinced of the success of the restructuring
efforts, or at least until they see some positive signs
that the restructuring programme is working. The
IMF has been monitoring the process of restructur-
ing in these countries and has on many occasions
expressed its satisfaction with the progress they
have made. The IMP'S endorsement has done little
in the way of building up foreign creditors' confi-
dence, however. Perhaps, as Radelet and Sachs
(1998b) point out, the IMP may be 'poorly placed
to rally market confidence in the short run'.
More importantly, there is no consensus on what
constitutes a successful restructuring. Experts differ
in their opinion of the proper scope, speed, and
optimal path of adjustment that a successful reform
of banks, corporations and labour markets would
require. There are also no widely accepted indica-
tors or criteria by which one could judge whether a
restructuring programme is progressing as planned.
Foreign market participants cannot be lumped into
a single group of homogeneous lenders. Instead,
they include a large number of commercial and
investment banks, insurance companies, bond mar-
ket dealers, and fund managers of all types with
diverse business backgrounds, and different invest-
ment strategies and interests. It is hard to imagine
that as a group they could reach consensus on the
optimal restructuring programme to help these East
Asian countries to find a way out of the current cri-
sis. Different individual lenders are likely to have
different views on the appropriate scope and speed
of any restructuring plan and react differently to the
side effects of a crisis. Some creditors may not
believe these crisis countries will survive the
restructuring programme or have the will to follow
it through to the end. They may view the side effects
as a signal of a mismanaged and hence unsuccessful
restructuring. In particular, small lenders have been
sensitive to the market disruption and instability
that inevitably occur during the restructuring
process.
Moreover, the dilemma of the collective action
problem that played a role in causing the crisis also
serves as a serious roadblock to the restructuring
process. Individually, some foreign creditors proba-
bly believe that the IMF programme is the best
alternative for the crisis countries to restore market
confidence in East Asia. They may also realise that
restructuring is a protracted process often marked
by backslidings and relapses and often opposed by
adversely affected groups such as labour uniOns.
They are also likely to know that the resumption of
lending and the restoration of export and import
related credits is crucial for speeding up the restruc-
turing process. However, few individual creditors
will make a move if other creditors do not lend as
well.
The reluctance of foreign creditors to restore trade
credit facilities and to extend new loans to these
countries creates a serious dilemma of a non-
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cooperative game, as their reluctance to normalise
credit flows certainly hampers and could possibly
jeopardise the entire restructuring programme. In
fact, the longer they wait until they see tangible
results of restructuring, the higher the restructuring
costs and hence the higher the potential losses to
international lenders. The reason for this is that the
restructuring plan cannot be engineered success-
fully unless corporations and banks are able to
obtain trade credits and new loans from interna-
tional financial markets. International creditors
know this, but they are demanding the evidence
that the restructuring plan is moving in the right
direction before extending their loans. And different
lenders demand different pieces of evidence. As a
result, the catch 22 situation continues in East Asia.
Individual lenders also know the pitfalls of the non-
cooperative game that both they and East Asian
countries are locked in. However, individual
lenders would not take an initiative to break the
deadlock by making a new loan unless other
lenders are prepared to do the same. As in the case
of a self-fulfilling crisis, the problem of collective
action in international capital markets could possi-
bly derail the IMF-guided restructuring plans.
3 The Contagion of the East
Asian Crisis
3.1 Evidence of contagion
Even a casual observation of the asset price
movements of East Asian countries strongly sug-
gests that the currency crisis in Thailand in July
1997 did indeed spill over into other Southeast
Asian countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Singapore - in the early stages and
to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea somewhat
later. The entire crisis began when the Thai habt lost
roughly 15 per cent of its value against the US dol-
lar nearly overnight after Thailand proved unable to
maintain its peg to the US dollar and adopted a
floating exchange rate system on 2 July 1997. This
sent shock waves throughout the whole of
Southeast Asia and immediately caused the
Malaysian ringgit, the Philippine peso, and the
Indonesian rupiah to fall precipitously The
Singapore dollar did not escape unscathed either,
although it held its value better than the other
currencies.
Other countries in East Asia have also beenaffected.
Taiwan and Korea have experienced large deprecia-
tion of their currencies and serious foreign-
exchange market turmoil. During the first five
months after the Thai crisis, Taiwan saw its cur-
rency depreciate by more than 16 per cent against
the US dollar, and the Korean won fell by 3.14 per
cent. Unable to control the speculative pressure on
the won and the volume and flow of foreign capital,
the Korean government by late November 1997 had
little other choice than to approach the IMF for
financial assistance, and it subsequently adopted a
free-floating exchange-rate system. While Hong
Kong has been able to maintain the parity of its cur-
rency vis-à-vis the US dollar - at the same level as
set in 1983 - despite the plunge in stock prices
caused by a large capital outflow, doubts have been
raised as to whether the Hong Kong authorities can
continue to protect their currency indefinitely in the
face of such a ferocious speculative attack and the
recent weakening of the yen.
All of the eight East Asian countries listed above
have seen huge declines in their stock prices in
addition to sustaining steep depreciations of their
currencies. The co-movements in the asset prices of
the East Asian currencies since July 1997 raise two
issues, which are interrelated. One is whether the
simultaneous depreciations in the currencies and
the sharp drop in stock prices of these countries
were the result of contagion of the Thai crisis. lt is
possible that all of these countries have experienced
internal and external shocks similar to those which
brought down the foreign exchange and other
financial markets in Thailand. On the other hand, if
indeed it can be shown that the Thai crisis has been
contagious, the East Asian experience also raises the
issue of the importance of identifying the causes of
contagion.
In order to ascertain whether the contagion effects
exist in the East Asian crisis, we examined to what
degree the volatility of the Korean won, measured
by the GARCH variance, has changed due to the
currency crises in Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. Conversely, we also investigated whether
exchange-rate volatility in those three countries was
affected by the outbreak of the currency crisis in
Korea (Park and Song 1998). Our empirical results
demonstrate that the currency crisis in East Asia
was contagious; the effects of the crises in Indonesia
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and Thailand were transmitted to the foreign-
exchange market while the effects of the Korean cri-
sis also spilled over into the two Southeast Asian
countries.
This empirical evidence raises two additional
questions. One naturally concerns the causes of the
contagion. Did the observed contagion reflect panic
on the part of international creditors as did the
crises in specific countries? Did international credi-
tors make little effort to distinguish among East
Asian countries including Taiwan and Korea? And
could the observed spillover be explained by weak
fundamentals in those affected countries and there-
fore be considered rational? This question will be
taken up in Section 4.
3.2 The channel of contagion
The other question concerns identification of the
major players who initiated and spread the conta-
gion throughout East Asia. Commercial banks, fund
managers, and other institutional investors and pri-
vate holders of Asian equities and other financial
assets, all must have been involved in and hence
responsible for the spillover of the Thai crisis.
However, is it possible to determine which particu-
lar group of foreign investors were the main carriers
of the contagion? Existing literature assumes that
one specific group of international institutional
investors played the most important role in spread-
ing contagion in the past financial crises in
emerging markets.
This is known as the institutional investors' practice
channel: contagion is transmitted through the
investment community in New York. The large
depreciation of the currency and decline in equity
prices in Thailand that occurred due to the Thai cri-
sis caused international investors to incur large cap-
ital losses. This may have induced institutional
investors in New York, specifically open-end emerg-
ing-market mutual-fund managers, to sell off secu-
rities in emerging markets after the Thai crisis in
order to raise cash, because they would naturally
expect to see a higher frequency of redemptions in
the wake of the Thai crisis. Another possibility is
that the Thai crisis could very well have induced
institutional investors in New York to sell off their
holdings in other emerging countries in East Asia,
because they tend to maintaïn proper proportions
of each type of stock, and stocks of each country or
region in their portfolios. As a result, the equity
markets in other East Asian countries would also
experience large declines in prices, and their cur-
rencies would significantly depreciate!
Frankel and Schmukler (1996) took up the
question of whether or not the institutional practice
channel was partly responsible for spreading the
contagion of the 1994 Mexican crisis to other devel-
oping countries in Latin America and Asia. If this
channel was important, then the international
mutual fund managers in New York would have
responded to the Mexican crisis by selling off secu-
rities in other emerging markets in addition to
Mexico. Frankel and Schmukler (1996) therefore
tested the hypothesis that the adverse shock in
Mexico was not directly transmitted to other emerg-
ing markets, but that instead it went through Wall
Street in New York on the way.
Following the method suggested by Frankel and
Schmukler (1996) we investigated the possibility of
contagion being transmitted by this channel in the
East Asian crisis (Park and Song 1998). Our empir-
ical results seem to indicate that the shocks to the
Thai stock market affected the stock markets of
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore through the
international financial centres. The institutional
practice channel does seem to have played a part in
transmitting the contagion of the Thai crisis to other
Southeast Asian countries.
4 Causes of Contagion
Most of the previous studies on currency crises had
sought to determine under what conditions and how
a speculative attack on a single foreign-exchange
market would be mounted and sustained (see e.g.
Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 1984; Flood and
Hodrick 1986; Blanco and Garber 1986). These
studies, however, do not analyse how a crisis in one
country can spill over into other countries. Impacts
which the Mexican crisis had on the currencies of
many other Latin American and even some Asian
countries, after it erupted in December 1994, are
well documented. Although the Mexican crisis has
generated a great deal of interest in analysing the
causes of speculative attacks, not much is known
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about the causes of contagion (see, e.g., Kaminsky et
al., 1997; Calvo and Mendoza 1996; Frankel and
Rose 1996). There are only a few recent empirical
studies on the causes of currency crisis contagion
(see, e.g. Calvo and Reinhart 1996; Frankel and
Schmukler 1996; Eichengreen et al. 1996).
By a broad classification, there are three causes of
contagion. The first is related to macroeconomic
similarities. It seems only reasonable to expect that
a currency crisis in one country will lead to an
attack on the currencies of other countries which
have macroeconomic conditions similar to those of
the country where the crisis began. For example,
international investors may readily conclude that
those countries which experience the same macro-
economic difficulties as Thailand will find it diffi-
cult to maintain the stability of their currencies, so
the investors subsequently pull out of these markets
en masse.
If the Thai crisis reflected macroeconomic
mismanagement and an unsustainable deterioration
in macroeconomic fundamentals, the macroeco-
nomic similarities suggest that to the extent
Southeast Asian countries share some of the same
structural characteristics and macroeconomic diffi-
culties in common, a similar problem was responsi-
ble for the contagion in East Asia in the second half
of 1997. On the other hand, if sudden shifts in mar-
ket expectations and confidence were the key
causes of the Thai crisis, then financial panic was
the major reason for the regional contagion.
The second cause of contagion is the trade link and
the associated competitive devaluations. Any coun-
try which is a major trade partner of a country
where a financial crisis has resulted in a large cur-
rency depreciation will likely be the target of a spec-
ulative attack on its foreign exchange market
because the investors will naturally expect it to
incur a decline in its exports to the crisis-affected
country and hence a deterioration in its trade
account. This may also be the case if the two coun-
tries compete heavily in the same export markets
because the depreciation of one of these country's
currencies will adversely affect the competitiveness
of the other country
The institutional investors' practice channel does not and elsewhere demand redemptions of their investment.
explain why stockholders of mutual funds in New York
The initial depreciation could lead, through trade
linkages, to a significant deterioration in the current
accounts as well as anticipated competitiveness of
other countries. According to Corsetti et al. (1998),
a game of competitive devaluation causes greater
currency depreciation than required by the initial
deterioration in fundamentals, and the non-cooper-
ative nature of the game results in still deeper
depreciation relative to what could have been
attained in a cooperative equilibrium. If market par-
ticipants expect that a 'game' of competitive devalu-
ation will follow as a result of a currency crisis in
one country, they will naturally sell their holdings
of securities of other countries and curtail their
lending or refuse to roll over short-term loans to
borrowers in those countries.
Even countries such as Taiwan and Singapore,
which were not necessarily vulnerable to specula-
tive attack, saw their exchange rates depreciate sub-
stantially An interesting question to be raised is
whether or not these two countries let their curren-
cies depreciate to maintain export competitiveness
in order to drain foreign reserves by defending the
original parity Their response may have been ratio-
nal and optimal in that the perceived welfare costs
of maintaining stable exchange rates might have
been too high. Corsetti et al. (1998) seem to argue
that these two countries would have defended the
original parities, given their massive holdings of
reserves, if they were not concerned about loss of
competitiveness. However, their decision to float
their currencies may have been dictated by their
efforts to fend off possible speculative attacks driven
by arbitrary shifts in expectations and the reaction
of panicky and irrational investors.
The third cause of contagion entails the process of
economic integration; that is, the integration of indi-
vidual countries' markets for both goods and ser-
vices, including financial services. In a region that is
increasingly integrated economically, the trade,
investment, and financial links transmit real shocks
to the financial markets of other countries. If firms
in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taïwan, and Korea had
exported and heavily lent to Thailand and Indonesia
and had also invested in firms in those two coun-
tries, the financial crisis would be rationally reflected
in the market valuations of Thai and Indonesian
firms and financial institutions, as their profitability
would be adversely affected by the crisis.
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With regard to the spread of the crisis, the degree of
financial market integration is especially important.
If the financial markets of the countries in the
region are tightly integrated, then market partici-
pants will expect to see co-movements in financial
asset prices in those markets. This condition may
give rise to contagion of a shock.
4.1 Macroeconomic similarities
The macroeconomic conditions of Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines were in many repects
similar before the Thai crisis erupted. These coun-
tries were dynamic, newly emerging economies
which had succeeded in sustaining rapid growth
through export promotion. It was also knowii that
their economic fundamentals were strong before the
onset of the financial crisis, but they shared some
rather more disturbing similarities as well.
First, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand experienced slowdowns in economic
growth in 1996. Second, they had seen their cur-
rent account deficits rise substantially, in part due to
sluggish growth in export earnings. As a percentage
of GDP, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand saw their current account deficits deterio-
rate substantially: from 2.0, 3.8, 1.7, and 5.7 in
1992 to 3.4, 4.9, 4.7, and 7.9 per cent in 1996
respectively. Third, these countries experienced
large foreign capital inflows during the 1990s, and
a significant part of these flows was in the form of
short-term portfolio investment. Fourth, the four
countries accumulated large external debts. In
1996, Indonesia's, the Philippines' and Thailand's
external debts amounted to 48.7 percent, 52.1 per
cent and 48.8 per cent of GDP respectively Fifth,
the real exchange rates in all four countries appre-
ciated markedly from 7.6 per cent in Indonesia to
11.9 per cent in the Philippines between 1990 and
the first half of 1997. Finally, the levels of interna-
tional reserves as a percentage of yearly imports
were falling in Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand during the first half of 1997 (for all these
data, see Park and Song 1998).
This common deterioration in macroeconomic
fundamentals suggests that these four Southeast
Asian countries had become increasingly vulnerable
to a reversal in capital flows and hence to a specu-
lative attack. Alarmed by the burgeoning current
account deficits, a growing number of international
creditors may have contemplated reductions in
their Asian exposure. The Thai crisis confirmed
their doubts, and triggered their pullout from other
Southeast Asian countries. In this sense, the conta-
gion in Southeast Asia was not necessarily the result
of financial panic but rather of rational decisions on
the part of investors. This explanation, however,
does not account for the speculative attacks on
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea, all of
which were known to be much stronger in terms of
macroeconomic fundamentals.
To examine this issue, we have devised a simple
score analysis of macroeconomic structure and
soundness (Park and Song, 1998). We have chosen
twelve macroeconomic variables for the eight East
Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Thailand). To measure their macroeconomic sound-
ness, we first calculate a mean and standard devia-
tion of each variable for the eight countries for the
1994-1996 period. On the basis of the magnitude
of the deviation from the mean, each country is
assigned a yearly score.
The results of our score analysis suggest that the
macroeconomic dissimilarities were substantial
among some countries; it is highly unrealistic to
lump all East Asian countries into a single categrory
in terms of macroeconomic conditions, especially in
the cases of Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
The speculative attacks on the currencies of these
countries seem to have been partly driven by
finanical panic.
4.2 Financial market integration
Cross-border bank lending, FOI and capital market
activities of international investors have encouraged
financial market integration among countries. In
general, the more closely integrated two countries
are financially, the more closely the financial prices
in those countries will move together over the long
run. Suppose that the stock markets in Thailand
and Indonesia are tightly integrated and that the
stock prices in Thailand decline significantly due to
a certain permanent shock. Investors, domestic as
well as foreign, will naturally expect stock prices in
Indonesia to fall, and probably without much time
delay, perhaps even as quickly as the very next trad-
ing day Observing the market plunge in Thailand,
investors will have a strong incentive not only to
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sell off Indonesian stocks but also to withdraw their
money from Indonesia. And so the shock which
originally hit Thailand spills over into Indonesia.
The financial integration of East Asian countries has
been examined in many empirical studies, but most
of them focussed on financial integration between
East Asia and the developed countries such as the
US and Japan (see e.g. Click and Hutchison 1990;
Cheng and Mak 1992; Bekaert and Harvey 1995;
Kuen and Song 1996). Their main findings suggest
that the financial markets of East Asian countrïes
have become increasingly integrated with the US
markets. It has been argued also that the liberalisa-
tion of domestic financial markets and cross-border
capital movements in East Asia have encouraged
financial integration among East Asian countries
(see e.g. Kawai 1995). However, no strong evidence
of extensive intraregional financial integration in
East Asia has been found, and more rigorous
analysis on this is needed.
Using the co-integration technique, we have
investigated whether the financial markets of East
Asian countries that experienced serious currency
crises during 1997-98 are integrated (Park and
Song 1998). If the financial markets of a given
group of countries are integrated and interdepen-
dent, there are probable co-integrating relationships
between the financial variables of these countries.
Our empirical results, however, show no strong evi-
dence that the financial markets of the crisis coun-
tries in East Asia are tightly integrated. For example,
a shock to the Thai financial markets or to the
Korean financial markets is not likely to have long-
run effects on the financial markets of other coun-
tries in the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and
the Philippines. Our results indicate that the finan-
cial-market linkage has not played an important
role in transmitting the effects of the Thai or the
Korean crisis to other countries in East Asia
One might wonder why the financial-market
deregulation and opening that has been progressing
in recent years in East Asia has not complicated the
current crisis as much it could have. Since the mid-
1980s, East Asian developing countries such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Korea have taken steps to deregulate and open their
domestic financial markets. As a result, by the early
1990s, they had established relatively liberalised
financial regimes, which in turn induced and
facilitated large capital inflows from advanced coun-
tries during the 1990-96 period. The volume of cap-
ital movements between these countries, on the other
hand, has been relatively small, mainly because they
have been net borrowers from the international
financial markets. Capital movements between these
countries are more likely a result of changes in the
country exposures by foreign investors. This pattern
of capital movements therefore suggests that the
financial markets of the East Asian developing coun-
tries have been more integrated with those of
advanced countries than with each other.
4.3 Trade linkage
All else being equal, any country which trades
heavily with Thailand, for example, would experi-
ence a deterioration in its trade balance in the event
of a large depreciation of the Thai currency As such
a depreciation would improve Thai exporters' com-
petitiveness, this would provoke a speculative
attack on the currency of the country in question,
that is, the important trade partner to Thailand.
This is indeed what occurred in 1993 in Ireland, a
country which trades very heavily with its nearest
neighbour, the United Kingdom (Eichengreen et al.
1996). Not surprisingly, the UK is Ireland's most
important export market. The Irish punt was
attacked at the beginning of 1993 after an attack on
sterling, which caused the British currency to
decline substantially
A depreciation of the currency of a country could
also affect the currencies of its major trading part-
ners in another way Suppose the Southeast Asian
countries, which trade heavily with Thailand, also
compete in the same export markets outside of the
region, for example, in North America. A large
depreciation in the Thai currency would mean sig-
nificant deterioration in any other Southeast Asian
country's international competitiveness relative to
Thailand. Its current-account balance would in all
probability turn for the worse, thus provoking an
attack on its foreign exchange market.
An examination of the direct trade relationship
between East Asian countries helps us to determine
whether or not the trade link has been important in
transmitting the contagion of crisis in East Asia. It
can be seen from the export matrix of the four
Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
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Philippines, and Thailand) and Korea for 1996 that
the direct trade links between the four Southeast
Asian countries are weak. It seems that the role of
direct trade linkage was weak in transmitting the
Thai crisis to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines. While Korea's direct trade links to indi-
vidual Southeast Asian countries are weak, the five
Southeast Asian countries together accounted for
more than 9 per cent of Korea's total exports. This
means that Southeast Asia as a whole is an impor-
tant export market to Korea, indicating that the
growing trade links may have been an important
cause of transmitting the contagion of the Southeast
Asian crisis to Korea.
Countries which compete in the same export
markets must closely monitor the fluctuations of
the real effective exchange rates of their competitors
and adjust their nominal exchange rates whenever
necessary, so as to preserve their competitive edge.
Given this kind of competition, the real effective
exchange rates between these countries are likely to
be highly correlated.
In order to verify this argument, we examined the
correlation coefficients of the monthly real effective
exchange rates of the four Southeast Asian countries
and Korea (Park and Song 1998). The correlation
coefficients for the entire sample period from
January 1990 toJune 1997 seem to indicate that the
interrelations between the Southeast Asian coun-
tries are weak. The correlation coefficient between
Thailand and Indonesia is the highest of all: about
0.8. However, during the period between January
1990 and December 1994, the correlation coeffi-
cients are lower than those of the entire period,
which means that the interrelations strengthened in
the last three years. This point can be further veri-
fied by the fact that the correlation coefficients
between these countries during the period from
January 1995 to June 1997 are much higher than
during the previous period. Most of the coefficients
are greater than 0.9. The real effective exchange
links between Thailand and the other Southeast
Asian countries, in particular, are very strong. This
evidence means that the competition in trade
between those countries in common export markets
has become more intense, suggesting that the
importance of trade links as a cause of the spillover
of the Thai crisis into other Southeast Asian
countries cannot be ignored.
Our conclusion is further corroborated by the
export similarity of the East Asían countries. We
established export similarity indices of the East
Asian countries and compared them (Park and Song
1998). It is found that East Asian countries are
heavily engaged in export competition to third mar-
kets outside as well as inside East Asia. This com-
petitive structure, to the extent it is known to
foreign investors, may have compelled a large num-
ber of them to pull out of the other countries in the
region when they saw the crisis develop in Thailand
in 1997.
5 Concluding Remarks
It has already been one year since the currency
crisis swept through East Asia, but Thailand,
Indonesia, and Korea are still beset by the feeling of
a sinking economy They are struggling to escape
from the miseries of job losses, business failures,
and bank closures brought on by the financial tur-
moil, and there seems to be no light at the end of
the tunnel. The crisis has been further compounded
by the lack of vision. The East Asian countries,
especially those hit hard by the crisis, have been
under pressure to dismantle the very economic sys-
tems that had worked so well for several decades
before breaking down suddenly last year. However,
few people seem to know what kind of systems
should replace the old ones. This sense of loss of
direction has made it difficult to reach consensus on
what should constitute an effective restructuring
programme and how it should be carried out.
The purpose of this article has been to analyse the
causes and consequences of the financial crisis in
East Asia. Por this purpose, we have examined
which of the two alternative explanations - panic or
fundamentals - was a critical feature of the crisis.
Although our empirical analysis is rather inconclu-
sive on the relative importance of the two views, it
clearly suggests that the massive inflow of capital
into the region during the 1990s was at the centre
of the crisis. The large capital inflow led to an
equally large increase in domestic investment in
manufacturing as well as in real estate and proper-
ties. The investment boom in turn resulted in real
appreciation, large increases in liquidity and rising
current account deficits.
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All of the countries under consideration in this
paper are classified as emerging market economies
that have grown rapidly and that have pursued lib-
eral economic policies. Foreigners were attracted by
their strong economic fundamentals, and the open-
ing of the capital markets in Southeast Asia facili-
tated portfolio investment. As a result of financial
market liberalisation and the subsequent inflows of
foreign capital from Europe, North America and
Japan, the region's financial markets have become
much more closely integrated with those of
advanced economies than with each other.
A visual inspection of the changes in financial
variables in the Southeast Asian countries indicates
that the Thai currency crisis has been contagious.
Our empirical analyses show that both fundamental
weaknesses and creditor panic were important in
transmitting the effects of the Thai crisis to the
other countries. The Thai financial turmoil first
spread to other member states of ASEAN including
Singapore, and then disrupted the financial and for-
eign exchange markets of Taiwan. The financial
instability in Taiwan no doubt contributed to the
stock market plunge in Hong Kong, which sent
shock waves to other stock markets throughout the
world. It was only a matter of time before Korea
would come under a speculative attack, which it
could not overcome.
We have examined, in the context of the ongoing
East Asian crisis, the three causes of contagion. It
has been found that the trade link partly explains
the contagion of the Thai crisis among the East
Asian economies. Our analysis also indicates that
macroeconomic similarities have contributed to the
spreading of the crisis, but not necessarily to
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea.
Our empirical tests suggest that institutional
investors operating out of New York and other
international financial centres played an important
role in transmitting the crisis to other Southeast
Asian countries. In fact, the financial turmoil
throughout East Asia was precipitated and further
aggravated by the mass withdrawal of funds by
institutional investors operating out of the major
international financial centres. When they saw the
crisis in Thailand, they may have panicked and hur-
riedly moved out of other East Asian countries,
irrespective of the latters' macroeconomic strength.
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